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Abstract 
The paper draws on the distinction between the concepts of individual and person to show how 
management rhetoric addresses workers as persons whereas actual management practices 
organize work as if workers were opportunistic individuals. We argue that this paradox is partly 
due to the widespread influence of agency theory whose conception of the firm, based on the 
agency costs generated by the supposedly non-cooperative workers’ behavior, became an 
influential normative model. Our argument is that agency theory’s basic assumption powerfully 
contributed to further and legitimize the ongoing power shift from labor to capital. Major 
institutional changes in corporate governance regulation are required to make firms’ behavior 
consistent with their rhetoric. 
 
 
Keywords: individuals’ vs persons, agency theory, cooperation, contemporary work, 
management paradoxes, social interactions at work. 
 
 
 
“… men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (Arendt, 1958:7) 
 
 
 
 
  
Individuals, persons and agency theory – contrasted views on social interactions at work 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt www.dinamiacet.iscte.pt 
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The several paradoxes that always marked the world of work had critically grown deeper in the 
last decades. Pressured by markets and shareholders to simultaneously innovate and reduce 
costs, firms’ management took on a schizophrenic turn. Being aware of the extent to which 
organizational efficiency depends on the workers’ motivation, firms attempt to mobilize the 
workers’ commitment through a trust-building and cooperative rhetoric. But the management 
practices they actually developed in the last years, based on tightened control and individualized 
incentives, can but undermine trust and cooperation (Drago and Garvey, 1998). 
 A close examination of this state of affairs makes one realizes that, whereas 
management rhetoric addresses workers as persons – that is, relational, socially embedded 
beings endowed with moral capacity (Harris, 1989), actual management practices address 
workers as individuals – that is, non-cooperative beings predominantly driven by self-interest. 
Since real workers are increasingly educated persons rather than mere self-interested 
individuals, their subjective involvement at work and expectations regarding work have tended 
to increase which, combined with the paradoxical injunctions referred above, are bringing about 
an unprecedented deterioration of the quality of work life.  
The argument of the present paper is that what underlies the increase in the gap between 
management rhetoric and practice is the prevailing influence of agency theory on both 
academics and practitioners. Indeed, agency theory came to form the common theoretical 
ground of mainstream economic theories of the firm since the 1970s, and it now also dominates 
other firm-related academic fields (corporate governance, law and economics, accounting and 
finance, etc). Beyond, or because of, this huge academic influence
1
, agency theory became a 
powerful normative model with pervasive real-world consequences. The roots of agency 
theory’s influence lie in its few but powerful basic assumptions. 
Firstly, agency theory conceives firms as a cascade of principal-agent relationships in 
which agents seek to maximize their self-interest and act opportunistically whenever possible. 
Such conception of relationships at work is at odds with the consideration of workers as 
persons; it is associated with a definition of firms as “nexus of contracts” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) established among amoral utility-maximizers whose effort must be tightly stimulated and 
monitored. Secondly, following Friedman (1970)’s seminal paper, agency theory assumes that i) 
“shareholder value” is the only legitimate goal of the corporate firm because ii) shareholders are 
                                                          
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the third most cited paper in economics among those published since 
1970; Michael Jensen is the fourth most cited author (Kim et al, 2006). 
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the owners of the firm. Whereas postulate i) has since long been debated in the literature, 
postulate ii) is less disputed though questionable, notably on legal grounds (Chassagnon and 
Hollandts, 2014; Robé, 2011, 2012; Blair and Stout, 1999).  
Even though agency theory did not directly influence the evolution of work, these 
assumptions about human behavior and the nature of firms contributed to legitimize the power 
shift from labor to capital that forms the hallmark of contemporary work. The aim of the present 
paper is to critically examine agency theory’s behavioral assumption and argue that it largely 
contributed to the intensification of the paradoxes presently undergone by workers.  
Our argument is structured as follows. We begin in section Two by highlighting the 
differences between the concepts of individual and person. We then draw on this distinction to 
argue that cooperative behavior, which ultimately distinguishes firms from markets, cannot be 
accounted for without the social and moral abilities of persons. Section Three presents first the 
management rhetoric aiming at mobilizing “persons” and then the actual management practices 
aiming at motivating and controlling “individuals”.  Section Four examines agency theory’s 
conception of social interactions at work and highlights the extent to which it departs from a 
person-based conception of behavior at work. Section Five relates the argument developed so 
far to the two other postulates of agency theory referred above and briefly sketches an 
alternative to the principal-agent/agency costs framework. Section Six concludes. 
 
2. THE CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON – 
APPLICATION TO THE SPHERE OF WORK 
 
Distinguishing between the person and the individual 
All heterodox economics approaches emphasize the need to replace the mainstream atomistic 
conception by a socially embedded conception of the individual, but none suggests a change in 
terminology.  In contrast, some philosophers and anthropologists employ different terms to 
single out these two different views of human beings. The concept of individual stresses the 
internal attributes and uniqueness of humans primarily conceived as separate while the concept 
of person adds to these substantive characteristics the recognition of the constitutive social 
dimension of humans. Whereas individuals are possessors of qualities indigenously describable 
in abstract terms (see the representation of the utility-maximizing individual by his indifference 
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map or utility function), persons are agents-in-society influenced by the context in which they 
live and the persons with whom they interact (Roger, 2012; Harris, 1989).  
 The supremacy of mainstream economics succeeded in imposing the atomistic, 
Hobbesian view, in which humans are able to survive and grow outside the world of social 
interaction. However, other philosophical strands argue that humans are constitutively relational 
beings since the genesis of the human mind is not mono-logical - something each person 
accomplishes on her/his own - but dia-logical, something that comes out of the exchanges with 
others, namely through language (Taylor, 1989). This tradition consequently characterizes the 
human condition by its gregariousness and its struggle for social recognition; persons enter into 
relations with others because of their need for relatedness and social esteem (Honneth, 1995). 
By contrast, rational choice theory retains the Hobbesian struggle for self-preservation as the 
basic human condition; individuals enter in relation with others when and if they need them to 
reach their goals, not for the relation itself. 
Focusing on humans as persons draws attention to two features crucial for our purpose. 
Firstly, all concepts of person explicitly emphasize the moral/judgmental capacities of humans. 
Whereas mainstream economics highlights the calculative abilities of individuals – required for 
utility maximization - the inter-subjective ontology of persons emphasize their interpretative 
and normative abilities (Favereau, 2008). Persons are capable of submitting their conduct to 
shared values and, thus, of committing themselves to common goals and complying with 
commitments. Only the concept of person, because it breaks with ontological isolation, is 
theoretically compatible with the idea of a common good, which supposes a commonly shared 
set of standards and values. Secondly, acknowledging the relational constitution of persons 
means recognizing their interdependence and vulnerability. Human beings need to relate with 
others, which makes them vulnerable to others’ actions and behavior (Honneth, 1995). This 
contrasts with the rational economic agent’s self-sufficiency. 
 The need to render behavior predictable - and thereby prone to modeling - led 
mainstream economists to adopting a view of the individual endowed with stable preferences 
and self-sufficiency. Even in the models that introduce social and moral motives into utility 
functions, individuals are calculative rather than gregarious beings. Relating with others and 
following behavioral norms result from individualistic, possibly enlightened, calculations rather 
than moral capacity: “We do not assume that people follow a social norm for its own sake, but 
we investigate how such a rule is sustained by self-interested community members” (Kandori, 
1992:63). Individuals as conceived by economists ultimately seek to maximize their utility; they 
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form groups to further their particular interests, not to fulfill any requirement of their flourishing 
as human beings.  
The relational and moral requirements of cooperative behavior 
The mainstream economics view logically assumes that individuals do not spontaneously 
engage in cooperative endeavors. Instead, cooperation acquires a social dilemmatic nature in 
that every individual would be better off if all cooperated, but each individual finds in his self-
interest to shirk on his contribution (Olson, 1971)
2
. Yet, the well-functioning of modern 
production processes, characterized by high levels of uncertainty, strong interdependence, and 
limited monitoring possibilities, requires that workers effectively cooperate, that is, requires that 
workers behave as persons not individuals.  
Cooperating implies (a) giving up on one’s desire to cheat or exploit cooperative 
partners and (b) expecting that others will cooperate too. Requisite (a) means that workers must 
commit themselves to the pursuit of a common goal rather than the one-sided pursuit of self-
interest. Yet, separate, independent and self-interested individuals would only engage in a 
common goal if it happens to converge with their private interests, not because it is a goal 
commonly pursued. Requisite (b) means that compliance with commitments and expectations 
about others’ behavior acquire crucial importance. Individuals who do not abide by social 
norms for their own sake would not expect co-workers to cooperate whenever it goes against 
their individual interests. It is the endorsement of moral norms that both establish and enforce 
mutual expectations.  
More precisely, workers cooperate because cooperating provides the opportunity to 
enter into interactions which satisfy the human need for gregariousness.  It may be said that 
cooperating gives rise to “relational goods”, defined as the outputs of a communicative, 
cognitive and affective nature generated by the interpersonal relations one enters into (Bruni, 
2008; Gui, 2000; Uhlaner, 1989). A given interaction gives rise to (positive) relational goods 
only if and when the interacting workers jointly value it. That is, relational goods (friendship, 
camaraderie, reciprocal helping, etc.) are more than just a combination of private goods; to the 
extent that they require a common valuation, they go beyond the individualistic derivation of 
utility. Relational goods explain why workers do not systematically exploit cooperative partners 
(requisite (a)). 
                                                          
2 There are models that show that spontaneous cooperative equilibria are sustainable among self-
interested individuals, but the conditions required, namely complete information about everyone past 
behavior, efficient sanctioning and continuing interaction, are seldom met in real-world. 
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Cooperating involves a series of mutual obligations that, depending on whether they are 
fulfilled or not, result in moral goods/bads (e.g. feeling fairly treated and respected versus 
deceived and humiliated). Moral goods are hence defined as the outputs of a moral nature 
generated by the social interactions in which workers enter (Lopes et al, 2009). Moral goods 
involve and require the common valuation of the norms that guide the actions of the interacting 
workers. The normative appeal of moral norms derives precisely from them being commonly 
shared. The fact that moral norms prescribe actions that may lead to acting contrary to self-
interest is of special importance. Indeed, only persons abiding to moral norms can expect others, 
whom they know share the same norms, to also abide by them even when it runs counter to their 
interest. The existence of moral goods explains how requisite (b) is met.  
To sum up, cooperative behavior at work cannot be accounted for without considering 
the role that relational and moral goods play in motivating and sustaining cooperation. If 
cooperation undoubtedly entails a calculative facet, it also inevitably calls for the relational and 
moral capacity of persons. Only morally able and gregarious persons, not calculative 
individuals, can enter into moral obligations with others. It is important to note that relational 
and moral goods stem from both horizontal and vertical interactions, that is, from relations with 
colleagues as well as with superiors. Relational and moral goods may obviously also be “bads” 
(animosity, disrespect, resentment, etc), in which case they can be destructive for the workers’ 
well-being and organizational performance. The fact that human beings are persons as defined 
above does not obviate that they do often behave as self-interested, indeed immoral individuals. 
It remains that the prevalence of cooperation in workplaces, on which capitalist societies rely to 
such an extent
3
, requires and implies nurturing both relational and moral goods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The fact that interpersonal relations at work are important and that workers endorse moral norms is 
often used to manipulate workers and perpetuate oppression in the name of overcoming it (Alvesson and 
Willmont, 1992). 
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3. FROM MOBILIZING PERSONS TO MANAGING INDIVIDUALS 
 
Firms’ appeal to the workers’ commitment and subjective involvement 
Firms know that workers, being endowed with moral capacities, are for the most part willing to 
behave cooperatively rather than opportunistically. To pursue the imperative of profitability, 
they then try to draw workers into a cooperative endeavor and ask them to invest themselves at 
work (cognitively but also subjectively and affectively). Indeed, the workers’ loyalty might be 
more efficiently achieved through internalized commitment than through obedience, technical 
prescriptions and bureaucratic control. As put by Boltanski and Chiappelo (1999), contemporary 
work requires the mobilization of the “whole person”. 
 The attempts of firms to bind workers to the firms’ interests have their academic 
expression in several strands of literature, among which corporate culture and the human 
resource commitment model (Francis and Keegan, 2006). Corporate culture is broadly defined 
as a set of values, norms and beliefs shared by the members of an organization that control and 
guide how individuals and groups interact with each other. Shared norms - as opposed to 
technical rules – are not and cannot be directly enforced by hierarchical control but may be 
fostered by a strong corporate culture. Shared norms are enforced by the members of the group 
themselves because they encompass behaviors that are essential to effective group functioning. 
Workers who violate shared behavioral norms may be subject to expulsion or ostracism, which 
generate affective and cognitive suffering (relational bads). Similarly, the “commitment model” 
prone by human resource scholars intends to empower workers and induce them to display self-
driven initiative and take more responsibility for monitoring their own behavior (Francis and 
Keegan, 2006). 
 These management models explicitly acknowledge that behavior at work is driven by 
internalized moral norms advocate that firms use the workers’ moral capacities in the interest of 
the firm. The social control resulting from the alignment of workers with organizational values 
would help firms operate like well-oiled machines without the need for extensive monitoring. 
Instead of relying on conformity and obedience, contemporary management is supposed to yield 
high levels of motivation and commitment through the building of strong corporate cultures and 
high performance work practices. Because work is not only a means to survival but also an 
opportunity for workers to realize their potential and satisfy their need for social esteem, 
workers are expected to subjectively engage in their work and devote great amounts of cognitive 
and emotional resources. Many management models now recognize that the economic world 
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depends on the social and moral abilities of persons, not simply the pecuniary motives of 
individuals, for its functioning.  
Note that strong corporate cultures and commitment models imply giving greater 
leeway to workers, which means enhancing autonomy at work, decentralizing and involving 
workers in decision-making, stimulating initiatives and risk-taking, promoting team work, 
allocating above-market pay (efficiency wages) and ensuring job security. These practices 
would foster a kind of relation between workers and the organization based on “partial-gift 
exchanges” (Akerlof, 1982), in which workers reciprocate in effort and dedication the good 
working conditions offered by the firm. If firms fail to comply with their engagements, workers 
disengage from the moral obligations that such practices are supposed to generate. 
 
Firms’ actual practices: the depersonalization and individualization of work 
However, evidence shows that actual firms’ practices break the “psychological contracts” 
presumed in the corporate culture and human resource rhetoric (Thompson, 2013). In the last 
decades, firms have managed workers more as if they were maximizing individuals than 
morally able social persons. The trends that characterize the world of work to-day are in plain 
contradiction with the rhetoric of trust-building and empowerment of workers
4
: rising wage 
inequalities; individualization of performance targets, appraisal schemes and wages; 
intensification of work; increasing levels of stress and emotional exhaustion; substitution of 
extrinsic by intrinsic motivations; extension of reporting procedures; expansion of monitoring 
devices; dissolution of collective solidarities, etc.  
These phenomena have made workers actively contribute to the considerable 
intensification of work observed in the last two/three decades (Lopes et al, 2014). They have 
resulted in increasing levels of stress and emotional exhaustion, substitution of extrinsic for 
intrinsic motivations and the dissolution of collective solidarities. Intensification of work is 
reported as being accompanied by a decrease in the time available for socializing - fewer “non-
productive” moments; less time to learn, teach or help; fewer opportunities to meet and 
communicate; increasing feelings of isolation – as well as by a general depersonalization and 
deterioration of work relations (Le Gall, 2011). 
Mention must be made of the evolution of autonomy at work as perceived by workers 
                                                          
4 We may add to these trends those of the evolution of employment, marked by depressive labor markets 
and the decline of security of employment, investment in human capital, career ladders, etc. 
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because this lies at the core of the commitment and corporate culture models, which recommend 
giving workers more influence at work. Instead of increasing over time and space, as might be 
expected, perceived work autonomy decreased or remained stable in most European countries in 
the 1995-2010 period (Lopes et al, 2014). Work autonomy declined markedly for workers in 
low-skill jobs in all but Nordic countries and it remained more or less stable for high-skill 
clerical workers in the 15 countries studied. These findings suggest that, overall and in spite of 
the higher educational level, the changes in work organization during the last two decades have 
led to a decrease in the influence that most workers now perceive they have over when, how and 
what to do at work when compared to the early 1990s.  
This evolution can only contribute to the dismantling of communal values such as 
trustworthiness, cooperative dispositions and community building, that underpin the 
management models referred above.  
 
A double paradox 
The phenomena and considerations described above reveal two paradoxes. The first concerns 
managerial practices: contemporary capitalism needs the cooperation and subjective 
involvement of workers but firms’ actual practices prompt competition rather than cooperation. 
The second paradox concerns workers: in spite of their worsening working conditions, workers' 
attachment to work does not seem to diminish.  
Let’s begin by the first, managerial paradox. The observation of unfulfilled 
“psychological contracts”, that is, of a gap between managerial words and deeds, is nothing 
new. Management rhetoric advocates risk taking, personal commitment and trust-building, but 
in practice firms invest in ever more sophisticated surveillance and control devices such as 
quantitative and individualized target setting and performance rankings. This paradox meets the 
person-individual distinction: firms want workers to involve themselves at work as persons but 
they organize work as if workers were opportunistic individuals, in need of being tightly 
directed and monitored. By individualizing incentives, controls and rewards, firms rely on the 
narrow self-interest of workers rather than on their trustworthiness and cooperative dispositions. 
Social interactions at work come to be regulated by competition. Rivalry and envy rather than 
mutual trust and reciprocity. 
 The paradox confronted by workers is particularly cruel. Work became in our societies a 
powerful generator of identity and self-respect. Many sociological studies testify that the 
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workers’ expectations of self-actualization and recognition at work increased notably in the last 
decades, due to increasing educational levels but also to the commodification of other spheres of 
social life (Carvalho and Rodrigues, 2008). The individualization and depersonalization of work 
environments hence created a tension between the need for a meaningful work, which 
necessarily includes feeling to contribute to a common goal and being part of a social 
community, and the pressure to enter into a competitive, zero-sum game. On the one hand, 
workers involve themselves as persons in work
5
 but, on the other hand, they are compelled to 
behave as self-centered individuals to meet the quantitative objectives fixed by management, 
contributing hence to eroding the collective and cooperative spirit needed for their 
psychological well-being. 
Workers’ vulnerability and psycho-social disorders have considerably intensified due to 
this state of affairs (Siegrist, 2006). Burn-out and stress, feelings of culpability when 
performance targets are not met, and feelings of isolation became prevalent phenomena of 
contemporary workplaces (Le Gall, 2011). Never before has the person-side of workers been so 
exploited and disrespected. Our argument is that this evolution of the world of work does not 
merely result from myopic managerial choices; it stems from the dominance of agency theory 
and the transformation of the latter’s postulates into a dominant ideology and normative model 
(Goshal, 2005).   
 
4. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AT WORK AS SEEN BY AGENCY THEORY 
 
Social interactions as costly contractual exchanges 
The management practices described so far (enhanced control, individualization of work, 
performance-related wages) closely follow agency theory’s prescriptions. These prescriptions 
derive logically from the behavioral assumption of individualistic utility-maximization, which 
in turn logically assumes potentially opportunistic behavior. Consequently, the core concept of 
agency theory is agency costs, that is, the costs generated by the likely shirking of workers, their 
providing low levels of effort (because work generates disutility) and their taking decisions that 
further their interests rather than that of the firm. 
                                                          
5 It must be noted that workers may be committed towards their work but not towards the organization in 
which they work (Cushen and Thompson, 2012), which further amplifies the paradoxical situation and its 
deleterious effects.  
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It is a particular kind of social interactions at work, namely principal-agent relationships, that 
grounds the whole theoretical apparatus of agency theory. Firms are conceived as a cascade of 
sequential principal-agent contracts in which principals delegate work to agents to act and 
decide on their behalf. This delegation allows agents to act opportunistically, which creates the 
well-know moral hazard situation
6
. Firms are nothing more than “nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:310). The contractual 
relationships that take place within the firm are of the same nature than market transactions: 
employers are not supposed to have any contractual obligation to long-term relationships with 
employees and the latter are assumed to be morally insensitive individuals who eventually 
renege on commitments. In the first agency models, only the vertical relationships, those of a 
principal-agent nature, were deemed of interest in the production process, each supervisor acting 
as a principal in relation to his subordinates and an agent to his own supervisor.  
Horizontal interactions
7
 among co-workers were nonetheless soon acknowledged in the 
literature, under the label of side-contracting. In the eyes of the then leading agency theorists, 
side-contracting takes the form of “bribes, personal relationships and promises of reciprocation” 
(Holstrom and Tirole, 1989:94). These “contracts” agents enter into cannot be fully controlled 
by principals, which generate agency costs and add “costly constraints to the owners’ 
optimization problem” (Holstrom and Tirole, 1989:3). Side-contracting is hence considered 
undesirable and firms must take measures to prevent it. Suggested measures include the 
limitation of personal relationships, through isolation, for example, and the restriction of 
reciprocity through the promotion of short-term relationships (Holstrom and Tirole, 1989). 
Though, these authors comment in passing that the measures they recommend may have 
organizational drawbacks since they may undermine the development of trust, which they view 
as crucial for cooperation. In subsequent papers, side-contracting is considered as taking two 
possible forms, collusion or cooperation, depending on its effect on the organization. The 
incentive and organizational structure should then regulate the degree of cooperation in order to 
limit collusion. In sum, employers cannot but be suspicious towards social interactions among 
workers.  
These radical assumptions about horizontal interactions at work smoothened somewhat 
                                                          
6 Before the 1970s, the relationship between employer and employee was not seen as particularly 
problematic in standard economics. Employees were simply to be remunerated according to their marginal 
productivity. It was agency theory and its postulate of opportunistic individuals which put at the center of 
the theory of the firm the notions of agency costs and moral hazard. 
7 Observational studies reveal that most workers spend the majority of their time interacting with peers 
rather than with supervisors and subordinates. This illustrates the crucial role of horizontal coordination 
and relational goods for cooperation. 
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after the advent of experimental and behavioral economics. Some principal-agent models began 
to explicitly acknowledge that workers derive utility from cooperation (defined as reciprocal 
helping) and that cooperative behavior among workers is a source of competitive advantage for 
organizations (Rob and Zemsky, 2002). It is recognized that “preferences for cooperating” are 
partly endogenous, which means that cooperative behavior may and should be fostered by 
appropriate incentive systems.   
Likewise, if the first agency theory models assumed that workers behave a- or 
immorally towards principals, in recent years, some agency theorists began to elaborate on 
Akerlof (1982)’s view of labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Dur et al (2010) call attention 
to the many benefits good relations between principals and agents may yield to the firm and 
emphasize the fact that such relations may motivate workers more powerfully than pecuniary 
incentives. Employees’ effort and employer’s benevolent treatment of workers are modeled as 
reciprocal gifts, and the signaling of good intentions on the part of principals, though costly, 
appears as a possibly efficient strategy (Non, 2012). 
Although these developments of agency theory denote an improvement in the way 
social interactions at work are envisaged, they differ to a great extent from the perspective 
endorsed here. To begin with, cooperation is not actually considered a collective/social 
endeavor; the decision to cooperate is taken separately by each worker depending on his/her 
preferences. Yet, as argued by Hodgson (2013), cooperating cannot be accounted for by 
introducing ad-hoc preferences into individualistic utility functions. Rather than a constitutive 
trait of human conduct, cooperating is viewed by agency theorists as a residual kind of 
behavior: “voluntary cooperation is defined as the difference between actual and privately 
optimal effort” (Non, 2012: 322). Secondly, instead of relational goods, sought and valued for 
their own sake by both employees and supervisors, social interactions are considered socio-
emotional resources that are costly to produce and regulate. Good relations at work are always 
envisaged instrumentally, as a tool to foster efficiency, rather than an end in itself. Lastly, the 
agency models that take cooperative dispositions into consideration remain an exception and 
social preferences are always introduced in an ad-hoc way into the individualistic theoretical 
apparatus. For agency theorists, relational goods do not stem from the social interactions 
associated to joint production but from the satisfaction of individual preferences. The legitimacy 
of the individualistic utility-maximizing assumption is never questioned.  
Another feature of the principal-agent models that take non-pecuniary motives into 
account is worth mentioning: they always end up recommending low-powered incentives, that 
is, reduced wages. Two explanations are advanced. Firstly, as cooperating increases the 
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workers’ utility, firms may offer lower wages – relational goods substitute for incentives and 
allow for a reduction in compensation. Secondly, since monetary incentives are acknowledged 
to crowd-out intrinsic motivations, that is, spontaneous cooperative behavior, incentive pay 
schemes are “inefficient”. In brief, though cooperating is crucial for the efficient functioning of 
firms, the workers who cooperate receive lower pecuniary compensation. Akerlof (1982)’s 
insight that gift-exchange relationships result from above-market wages has been turned upside 
down - which is but one sign of the perversity of agency theory’s prescriptions. 
 
The perverse effects of agency theory’s prescriptions – when a false theory threatens to 
become true 
To minimize the agency problems supposed to originate from the workers’ opportunistic 
behavior, agency theory prescribes two kinds of arrangements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976): i) 
compensation schemes aimed at aligning the principal and agents’ interests (particularly 
recommended for high corporate executives) and ii) control devices aimed at keeping self-
serving behavior in check and providing information about what agents are actually doing. Both 
arrangements would curb agents’ opportunism since they reduce the conflicts of interest and 
prevent agents from deceiving principals. But the widespread implementation of these 
prescriptions may be at the root of the decline in perceived work autonomy reported above.  
 These practices may have even more deleterious counterproductive effects: instead of 
mitigating opportunistic behavior, they may actually create and enhance such behavior (Goshal, 
2005; Roberts, 2005). The use of strict control devices signals to workers that they are not 
trusted, which may result in them becoming less trustworthy. Indeed, strict monitoring is shown 
to threaten the sense of personal autonomy, thereby damaging self-esteem and decreasing 
intrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005). When workers are excessively controlled, intrinsic 
motivation is supplanted by defensive or self-protective processes such as the tendency to 
withdraw concern for others and focus on oneself (Deci & Ryan 2000).  Workers then tend to 
adhere to more materialistic values and behave less cooperatively. Sheldon et al (2004) show 
that workers involved in controlling environments appear less satisfied at work and more 
focused on pay and benefits.  
In the same vein, the use of monitoring tools by managers leads them to distrust 
workers and triggers a pathological spiral. These processes are well-known by psychologists: 
“Surveillants come to distrust their targets as a result of their own surveillance and targets in 
fact become unmotivated and untrustworthy. The target is now demonstrably untrustworthy and 
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requires more intensive surveillance, and the increased surveillance further damages the target. 
Trust and trustworthiness both deteriorate” (cited in Goshal, 2005: 85). This problem also 
concerns top executives whose compensation schemes are recommended to be aligned with 
shareholder’s interests. Many of the reforms set up to curb top executives’ opportunism in the 
last decades ended up augmenting rather than diminishing the governance problem (Roberts, 
2005). As Hannah Arendt (1958) brilliantly put, the danger with theories is not so much that 
they are false, it is that they may become true. In assuming that people behave opportunistically 
and are primarily motivated by pecuniary motives, agency theory may contribute to make 
people behave just like that.  
 The management prescriptions that logically derive from agency theory may hence 
undermine cooperative and other moral and pro-social dispositions. This is not seen as a 
problem by agency theorists who, in reducing social interactions to contracts and defining firms 
as “privately owned markets” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 795), are in fact claiming that the 
well functioning of firms does not require morally-driven behavior. A strand of agency theory 
literature acknowledges the vital role of “relational contracts”, defined as informal agreements 
and unwritten codes of conduct, in enforcing incomplete contracts and complying with 
commitments (Baker et al, 2002). But, despite the term “relational”, such contracts are deprived 
of any kind of personal or social ties. They are plainly impersonal relationships in which the 
honoring of contracts is exclusively based on self-interested calculations. Baker et al (2002:74-
75)’s models provide the incentive payments that comprise the “necessary and sufficient 
condition for the relational-employment contract to be self-enforcing”. The social constitution 
and moral endowment of workers is therefore not necessary for contracts to be honored. 
The argument developed in the present paper, namely that relational and moral 
dispositions are the basis for well-functioning organizations, claims just the opposite. One of the 
basic distinguishing features of firms when compared to markets is that firms provide the 
opportunity for intensive interpersonal relationships. It is precisely the unspecified obligations 
and the exchange of socio-emotional benefits deriving from social interactions that contribute to 
generating the desire to cooperate and render cooperation sustainable. But agency theorists 
discard the social and moral dimension of work because they would like to free economic 
agents from moral obligations and social ties. More specifically, the economic agents that 
agency theory would like to free from any moral obligation are the shareholders. 
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5. WHAT IS ACTUALLY AT STAKE IS THE AGENCY THEORY’S 
CONCEPTION OF THE FIRM 
 
The ownership and governance/responsibility postulates  
We have seen that the features of contemporary work  strikingly conform to the way in which 
agency theory conceives of economic behavior and social interactions at work. Definitely, 
agency theory is presently much more than a purely positive conception of firms; it became a 
normative model that largely influences the way in which work is organized (Goshal, 2005). 
But two other basic postulates of agency theory also powerfully contributed to the present state 
of affairs, namely: i) the ultimate goal of principals/managers is the maximization of 
shareholders’ interests (measured by the market value of the shares) because ii) shareholders are 
the owners of firms. These postulates conferred academic legitimacy to the growing adoption of 
the “shareholder value governance model” witnessed over the last thirty years. By pressuring 
managers to focus on creating value for shareholders, this governance model submitted firms to 
the imperative of financial profitability, thereby neglecting workers’ well-being and bringing 
about the dramatic loss of power labor is presently undergoing (Fligstein and Shin, 2004). 
Shareholders’ interest would prevail over workers’ rights; labor costs were to be minimized. 
 The ownership postulate (ii)) supports the principal-agent view of corporate firms, as 
stated by Friedman (1970:2): “a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the 
business”. A few agency theorists, though, do not endorse this postulate: “ownership of capital 
should not be confused with ownership of the firm” (Fama, 1980:290). Indeed, the firm and the 
corporation must be distinguished: the firm is an organized economic activity with no juridical 
personality – it can hence not be owned – while the corporation is a legal subject used to legally 
structure the firm – it cannot be owned either, only the shares it issues can be8. Shareholders 
enjoy the privileges of the owner only towards what they own – the shares -, they cannot have 
these privileges towards the corporation having issued the shares, and much less so towards the 
firm. The ownership postulate is founded on a misunderstanding of the actual content of 
corporate law (Robé, 2011, 2012; Favereau and Robé, 2012; Blair and Stout, 1999). 
Since the ownership postulate does not hold, postulate i), also uttered by Friedman 
(1970) - the primary responsibility of managers is to shareholders -, also drops, which implies 
that managers are responsible not just to shareholders but to all the contributors of resources to 
the firm, first and foremost workers. Actually, corporate law never refers to any legal duty to 
                                                          
8 These considerations only apply, obviously, to public corporations, not individually-owned firms. 
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maximize profits; it only establishes the duty to manage in the “corporate interest”, not the 
shareholders’ interest.  
Faced with this ownership problem, agency theorists developed in the last years an 
economic justification for the principle of shareholder value maximization, according to which 
the best way to ensure economic efficiency is to consider managers the agents of shareholders. 
The “nexus of principal-agent contracts”’ definition of the firm would then be preserved and the 
issue of ownership is deemed irrelevant. However, the fact that shareholders own the shares 
issued by the corporation but not the corporation itself has very significant consequences, since, 
as referred, the responsibility of managers then go beyond that of maximizing shareholders’ 
interest to encompass the interests of all resources contributors (Roger, 2012).  
In this context, firms cannot any more be conceived as cascades of principal-agents 
relationships in which the sole relevant problems are those of agency costs and the sole relevant 
prescriptions are the design of appropriate devices to align managers and shareholders’ interests. 
An alternative theory of the firm is needed, which would revolve around concepts other than 
that of agency costs.  
 
Sketching some hints for an alternative 
Our intent here is merely to give some of the elements that should be taken into account by 
alternative(s) theory(ies) of the firm. To begin with, and in accordance with the theoretical 
considerations made above, a meaningful theory of the firm would follow Barnard’s definition 
of firms as “systems of cooperative services of persons” rather than the “sum of services of 
individuals” (Barnard, 1938: 110, our italics). That is, the behavioral assumption to be put at the 
core of the theory of the firm should consider both the cooperative and self-interested 
dimensions of human behavior. Because it is the possibility of cooperation that justifies the 
existence of firms in the first place, as claimed by institutionalists and Alchian and Demsetz, the 
theory’s prescriptions would focus on fostering cooperative dispositions rather than trying to 
economize on, and indeed discard, agent’s moral and social capacities.  
But preventing firms and workers from being caught ever more deeply in the paradoxes 
described above cannot be left to managerial perspicacity or the self-regulating capacities of 
boards or markets. Evidence shows that the failure of commitment models to yield the expected 
positive outcomes on productivity and workers is due to the insufficient participation of workers 
in decision-making (Godard, 2004). A full implementation of the commitment model or a 
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consistent corporate culture demands that much voice and power is given to workers, which 
most employers are not prone to do and this, because they do not have to.  
The empirical solution to the contemporary degrading of work cannot be purely 
organizational. Institutional changes that foster the workers’ rights and challenge the 
shareholder primacy norm are called for. The required institutional innovations must reinforce 
workers’ rights rather than dismantle them, as in the newly created “employee shareholder 
contract” in the UK (Prassl, 2013). The imbalance of power embodied in the institutional 
structure of the employment relationship is ultimately associated to the non-cooperative 
behavioral assumption. Changing the latter should stimulate a reduction in both the vulnerability 
and subordination condition of workers. The workers’ needs go beyond the extrinsic dimensions 
of wages or decent working hours to encompass the psycho-social work environment. The 
changes in labor law should be necessarily complemented by a change in corporate law that 
would promote the workers’ rights in the governing structure of corporate firms. Our analysis 
hence leads to recognizing the need for juridical and economic institutions able to regulate firm 
governance, which is precisely what the launching of agency theory wanted (and succeeded) to 
avoid in the early seventies (Gindis, 2013). 
Inspiration for both the behavioral assumption and institutional framework (involving 
both labor and corporate law) that would underlie alternative theories of the firm might be found 
in the common law concept of fiduciary relationship
9
, instead of the now prevalent principal-
agent relationship. Fiduciaries are ethical relationships of trust between two or more parties who 
are assumed to be moral actors rather than selfish utility maximizers. “The moral theme in 
fiduciary regulation is an important part of fiduciary law” (Frankel, 1983:830). Frankel (1983) 
sharply differentiates the world of contracts - in which each party distinguishes her interests 
from those of others and acts on her benefit – from that of fiduciaries – who are expected to 
further the interests of another party rather than their own (which is what workers are actually 
supposed to do).  
Very substantial normative consequences would ensue for how work is to be organized. 
While the norm of self-interest calls for devices aimed at restraining opportunism, the norm of 
trust in fiduciary relationships requires that monitoring and control devices, though necessary, 
do not undermine trust and intrinsic motivations. In arrangements categorized in law as agency, 
entrustors control their fiduciaries in the performance of their services; in arrangements 
                                                          
9 http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty 
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categorized as trust, fiduciaries are entrusted with power and enjoy broader discretion to carry 
out their tasks. 
As it could be expected, law and economics scholars deny the distinct nature of 
fiduciary relationships, which in their view “have no moral footing; they are the same sort of 
obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings” 
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1993: 429). This rationale meets agency theory’s theoretical attempt 
to free principal-agents relationships from moral obligations but stands in sharp contrast to 
firms’ management rhetoric. Real-world firms do persist in their effort to mobilize the “whole 
person” in workers, which means that they do not (cannot) renounce expecting that workers 
behave as “fiduciaries” - being loyal to their employer; conducting themselves in a trustworthy 
and cooperative manner; honoring the non-contracted obligations inherent in incomplete 
contracts, etc. Why doesn’t agency theory account for what exists in reality?  
The answer is quite straightforward: because it would jeopardize agency theory’s 
theoretical apparatus. To acknowledge the moral dimension in “principal-agent” relationships, 
that is, to recognize that workers are persons and not just individuals, would imply recognizing 
that social interactions in firms differ from market contracting, which in turn would undermine 
the nexus of contracts definition of the firm. This definition of firms denies the collective nature 
of production: “we believe the emphasis that [Alchian and Demsetz (1972)] place on joint 
production is too narrow and therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the 
firm […] joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of individuals 
associated with a firm” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:8). Yet, firms are social entities that cannot 
be reduced to the sum of the individuals who comprise them since production requires that these 
constitutively social individuals enter into complex and continual interactions.  In reducing 
firms to markets, agency theory wanted to free economic agents from the need for personal 
relationships and thereby from the fragility of relational and moral goods. But the only way to 
keep this fragility in check is to create appropriate institutional frames.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Our point of departure was the observation of an increasing contradiction between management 
rhetoric - which tries to draw workers into a collective, cooperative endeavor - and management 
practices - which continually reinforce control and rely on individualistic, market-type 
incentives. We argue that the increase in this contradiction – itself inherent to capitalism - is 
associated to the widespread influence of agency theory, and specifically to its success in 
turning into influential normative models the basic assumptions on which it is grounded. Its 
conception of human agency, based on the assumption of self-interested, opportunistic, 
behavior, combined with the ownership postulate and the related governance prescriptions 
powerfully contributed to enhancing the pressure for financial profitability and labor costs 
reduction, thereby weakening the power of workers and degrading the psychosocial work 
environments. 
We draw on the distinction between the concepts of individual and person to show that 
management rhetoric addresses workers as persons but actually organizes work as if workers 
were opportunistic individuals. While the concept of individual defines humans as unique and 
separate beings engaged in the pursuit of self-centered goals, the concept of person defines them 
as constitutively social, morally-endowed beings prone to cooperative behavior because of their 
need for gregariousness. We then show that cooperation, on which the well-functioning of 
modern productive processes depends, as acknowledged in management rhetoric, would not be 
sustainable among “pure” individuals. Indeed, cooperating implies i) giving up on one’s desire 
to exploit partners and ii) expecting that others cooperate too. Why and how would individuals 
satisfy these requisites? In contrast, because they value social interactions and because they 
endorse shared moral norms, persons cooperate even when it runs counter to their interest.  
Agency theory’s disregarding of the relational and moral dimensions of workers is 
consistent with its definition of firms as nexus of contracts, which equates social interactions at 
work to market interactions and denies the collective character of production. Like neoclassical 
economics, agency theory wants to free economic agents from – the vulnerability of – moral 
obligations and social ties. Its prescriptions, aimed at constraining and aligning self-interested 
individuals, indirectly but powerfully molded the processes of individualization and 
depersonalization that mark contemporary work. Beyond their deeply deleterious effects on the 
workers’ health and well—being, these processes are fostering the opportunism they were 
supposed to restrain.  
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Recognizing that the good working of firms and their creativity necessitates treating workers as 
persons rather than individuals, combined with accepting that shareholders cannot be said to 
own corporate firms, leads to questioning the legitimacy of the power of the owners of capital in 
corporate firms and thereby their governance structure and responsibilities. In order to coerce 
firms to be more consistent with their own rhetoric, major institutional changes are required. 
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